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We at the Fed will keep   
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growth and price   
dynamics of   
the economy.   
In hard times, properly targeted and timely 
government spending can act as a short-term 
crutch,  serving  as  temporary  support  until 
the private market is again able to stand on 
its own. The crutch has been sorely needed 
the past two years as we have dealt with a 
severe financial crisis and deep recession.
Help in averting an even worse econom-
ic malady has come at substantial cost. We at 
the Dallas Fed calculate that this year’s spend-
ing by federal, state and local authorities—net 
intragovernmental  transfers,  in  economists’ 
lingo—will sum to more than a third of our 
gross domestic product. Federal deficits alone 
are projected to total between $7 trillion and     
$9 trillion for the next 10 years. These are 
truly startling figures. 
The  Federal  Reserve  does  not,  and 
should not, involve itself in the planning or 
execution of the federal budget. Taxing and 
spending is the business of those serving in 
the legislative and executive branches. 
Yet, deficit spending does have the potential to impact the conduct of mon-
etary policy.
Historically, fiscal deficits that loom too large for too long come with a signifi-
cant long-term price tag: the potential for higher interest rates and higher tax rates. 
As these deadweights bog down economic growth, fiscal authorities may look to 
the central bank to monetize the debt and inflate away government largess.
I know of no member of today’s Federal Open Market Committee who has 
any intention of acquiescing to such pressures, should they materialize. 
Maintaining a balance between necessary fiscal stimulus and long-term fis-
cal health is a task for the folks we elect to represent us. But we at the Fed will 
keep a watchful eye on fiscal policy’s effects as we monitor the growth and price 
dynamics of the economy.
We will also continue to monitor the fiscal health of states. When national 
economic conditions deteriorate, state governments typically face budget squeezes, 
forcing them to choose between painful program cuts and tax hikes. This downturn 
has proven particularly difficult for state budgets, as senior research economist Ja-
son Saving tells us in Southwest Economy’s “On the Record” interview (see page 8). 
Fortunately, he finds Texas to be more fiscally fit than other states.
 
  Richard W. Fisher
  President and CEO
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Getting to the Bottom  
of Texas’ Latino Pay Gap
By Pia Orrenius, Madeline Zavodny and Emily Kerr
We consider a host of factors 
that may be keeping Latino 
wages relatively low in our 
region. Key among these 
factors is education.
Among Latinos, the U.S. born make up a 
majority in Texas but a minority in the rest 
of the country.1 Because natives typically 
earn more than immigrants, a state with a 
large, established population of U.S.-born 
Latinos might be expected to have relatively 
high Latino wages.
That’s not the case in Texas. The Latino 
wage gap—the difference between the wag-
es of Latinos and non-Hispanic whites—is 
significantly larger in Texas than in the rest 
of the nation.
What drives the gap in Texas? To find 
out, we look at Latinos’ recent contributions 
to the state’s labor force and trends in their 
wages in the state and nation. Then we con-
sider a host of factors that may be keeping 
Latino wages relatively low in our region. 
Key among these factors is education. 
Texas Latinos have fewer years of school-
ing than non-Hispanic whites in Texas and 
Latinos living in other parts of the U.S. 
This poses a critical challenge as the Texas 
economy moves forward—improving the 
educational attainment of an increasingly 
significant segment of its population.
The Latino Workforce
Texas is home to 8.9 million Latinos—
second only to California among the states. 
Texas’ Latino population more than doubled 
between 1990 and 2008, increasing faster 
than any other major demographic group.
This rapid growth partly reflects in-
ternational and domestic migration. The 
newcomers are largely attracted by Texas’ 
strong economy. State employment has 
increased an average of 2.3 percent a year 
since 1990, about a percentage point faster 
than in the nation.2 A relatively low cost of 
living is another pull factor. Housing costs 
are much lower in Texas than in other large 
states, both in absolute terms and relative 
to income.
A high fertility rate also contributes 
to the growing Latino population. In 1996, 
José replaced Michael and Christopher as 
Texas’ most popular male baby name, and 
it has remained on top ever since, according 
to the Social Security Administration. Texas 
stands as the only state to have a predomi-
nantly Hispanic baby name ranked No. 1; no 
Latino baby names made it into the U.S. top 
25 in 2008.3 
The Latino population’s increase has 
transformed Texas’ labor force and led to 
faster economic growth. Latinos accounted 
for 76 percent of the state’s labor force 
growth between 1994 and 2008.
We can look at Latino wages and the 
makeup of the labor force through the 
Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey 
(CPS), a large-scale monthly poll of about 
50,000 U.S. households.4 It yields a wealth 
of individual-level data on wages, employ-
ment, household composition and demo-
graphic characteristics. Individuals identify 
themselves as being of Hispanic origin or 
descent. The CPS has included a question 
on country of birth since 1994.
The Latino share of the Texas labor 
force rose from 27 percent in 1994 to more 
than 38 percent in 2009 (Chart 1). In the 
rest of the country, Latinos were 8 percent 
of the labor force in 1994 and 12 percent 
in 2009.
Native Latinos accounted for slightly 
more than half the increase in Texas, rising 
from 17 percent of the Texas labor force in 
1994 to 23 percent in 2009. Foreign-born 
Latinos increased from 10 percent to 15 
percent.5 At the national level, most of the 
growth in Latino labor force share came 
from immigrants.
The Latino Wage Gap 
Texas Latinos’ median hourly earnings 
were $11.54 in 2007–09, about 64 percent 
of what the state’s non-Hispanic whites 
earned (Table 1).6 Latinos in the rest of the 
U.S. did better, earning $12.42, or about 71 
percent of non-Hispanic whites’ earnings. 
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Median weekly earnings showed a similar 
pattern. Latinos received $468.16 a week in 
Texas, or about 60 percent of the non-His-
panic white median. Nationally, their pay 
was higher at $498.42 a week, or about 68 
percent of non-Hispanic whites’ earnings.
By both measures, Latinos have lower 
wages in Texas than in the rest of the 
country—in absolute terms and relative to 
non-Hispanic whites. Comparing relative 
wages provides a way of controlling for 
state-specific factors, such as Texas’ lower 
cost of living.
Why do Texas Latinos earn less? For 
starters, they’re younger than the state’s 
non-Hispanic whites, which suggests fewer 
years of work experience. Texas Latinos 
age 25 and over also have considerably less 
education. About 40 percent didn’t graduate 
from high school, compared with just 5 per-
cent of Texas non-Hispanic whites. Eleven 
percent earned college degrees, well below 
the 38 percent of non-Hispanic whites. 
Texas Latinos are less likely to work. 
Two-thirds are employed, compared with 
74 percent of the state’s non-Hispanic 
whites. This stems largely from women’s 
decisions about working outside the home. 
Texas’ Latino women are about 13 percent-
age points less likely than non-Hispanic 
white women to be employed.
Texas’ high income inequality also plays 
a role.7 The disparity between high- and 
low-wage earners exacerbates Texas’ Latino 
wage gap when compared with states that 
have more uniform earnings distributions.
These comparisons help explain the in-
state earnings differences, but what about 
the Latino wage gap between Texas and the 
rest of the nation? The state’s non-Hispanic 
whites contribute to it because they have 
higher earnings and more years of educa-
tion than non-Hispanic whites in the rest of 
the U.S. At the same time, Texas Latinos dif-
fer from Hispanics elsewhere in important 
ways that depress their relative earnings.
Native-born Latinos earn 17 per-
cent less per hour in Texas than in other 
states—$12.46 versus $15.10 (Table 2). For-
eign-born Latinos in Texas also earn less, 
but the difference is only 9 percent—$10.28 
versus $11.25. Texas tops the nation in 
share of native born in the Latino popula-
tion. When combined with the pay dispari-
ties, this suggests the native born are largely   
behind Texas Latinos’ wider wage gap.
On the upside, native-born Texas La-
tinos are more likely to work than their 
national counterparts. However, this factor is 
Table 1
Texas Latinos Differ from Non-Hispanic Whites and Other Latinos
Latinos Non-Hispanic whites
Texas Rest of U.S. Texas Rest of U.S.
Hourly earnings ($) 11.54 12.42 17.90 17.56
Weekly earnings ($) 468.16 498.42 776.27 733.78
Age 36 35 40  40 
Female (%) 49 47 50 50
Immigrant (%) 41 58 3 4
Education
Less than high school (%) 40 36 5 6
High school (%) 29 30 26 30
Some college (%) 20 20 31 29
College (%) 11 14 38 35
Employment status
Employed (%) 67 68 74 73
Unemployed (%) 5 8 4 5
Not in labor force (%) 29 26 24 23
NOTES: Shown are weighted sample means of monthly data from 2007–09 for individuals age 16 to 64. Education variables include only 
individuals age 25 and older. Earnings are medians and are deflated using the consumer price index for urban workers (June 2009 = 100).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using 2007–09 Current Population Survey data.
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wide Latino wage gap. One is that a signifi-
cant number of the state’s Latinos live along 
the Texas–Mexico border—about 23 percent, 
or roughly 2 million people. Hispanics in 
these border areas earn lower wages than 
Hispanics in the state’s interior, depressing 
average earnings for Latinos in the state.9 
Research has found that Latino im-
migrants tend to earn less than native-born 
workers even at similar education levels. 
They often lack English fluency, institutional 
knowledge and social capital. For some, 
illegal immigrant status is a barrier to better-
paying jobs.
The lower wages might also be policy 
related. Some states with large Latino popula-
tions set their minimum wages above the fed-
eral standard. For example, California raised 
its minimum from $5.15 in 1997 to $7.50 in 
2007, while the federal minimum held steady 
during this 10-year period at $5.15. By con-
trast, Texas tied its minimum wage to the 
federal rate. This put low-wage Texans at a 
disadvantage in cross-state comparisons. 
It should be noted that Texas’ lower 
cost of living makes up for a portion of 
the Latino earnings deficit relative to La-
tinos elsewhere, although it does nothing 
to mitigate the in-state wage gap relative 
to non-Hispanic whites.10 According to the 
American Chamber of Commerce Research 
Association’s state survey, Texas had the 
fourth-lowest cost of living in 2009, trailing 
Oklahoma, Tennessee and Kentucky. 
An important factor in the lower cost 
of living is housing affordability. In 2008, 
the median value of an owner-occupied 
home in Texas was $126,800. By compari-
son, median values were $467,000 in Cali-
fornia, $318,900 in New York and $218,700 
in Florida.11
In Texas metropolitan areas, 70 to 
75 percent of homes sold are considered 
affordable for a family with a median 
household income.12 Other major Latino im-
migrant destinations are far behind—New 
York at 21 percent, Los Angeles at 42 per-
cent and Miami at 53 percent.
The Wage Gap over Time
The Latino wage gap has persisted but 
hasn’t gotten worse. Latino and non-Hispan-
ic white workers saw real weekly earnings 
rise at roughly the same pace from 1994 to 
2009 in the U.S. and Texas (Chart 2).
The bulk of Latino wage growth, 
particularly in Texas, occurred during the 
booming 1990s. Immigration was high at 
the time, making the wage increases even 
pared with 27 percent elsewhere. Perhaps 
more telling, 85 percent in Texas were born 
in Mexico, compared with 62 percent in 
the rest of the country. Research shows that 
Mexican immigrants tend to have lower skill 
levels than Latino immigrants from other 
countries. They’re also more likely to lack 
legal status—the case for more than half of 
Mexican-born Hispanics in the U.S.8 
Other factors may contribute to Texas’ 
more than offset by educational differences. 
In Texas, 23 percent of native-born Latinos 
age 25 to 64 are high school dropouts, com-
pared with 14 percent in the rest of the na-
tion. And 14 percent have college degrees, 
well below the 20 percent of native-born 
Latinos elsewhere.
Texas’ Latino immigrants are also very 
different from their U.S. counterparts. Only 
22 percent in Texas are U.S. citizens, com-
Chart 2
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Table 2
Whether Foreign or Native Born, Latinos Earn Less in Texas
Foreign-born Latinos Native-born Latinos
Texas Rest of U.S. Texas Rest of U.S.
Hourly earnings ($) 10.28 11.25 12.46 15.10
Weekly earnings ($) 413.01 445.08 508.25 614.37
Age 37 37 35 32
Female (%) 45 45 51 51
Education
Less than high school (%) 60 48 23 14
High school (%) 23 28 34 33
Some college (%) 10 13 28 33
College (%) 8 11 14 20
Employment status
Employed (%) 68 71 67 64
Unemployed (%) 5 7 6 9
Not in labor force (%) 29 24 29 29
Citizen (%) 22 27 – –
Born in Mexico (%) 85 62 – –
Born in C. America (%) 10 15 – –
NOTES: Shown are weighted sample means of monthly data from 2007–09 for individuals age 16 to 64. Education variables include only 
individuals age 25 and older. Earnings are medians and are deflated using the consumer price index for urban workers (June 2009 = 100). 
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judged relative to other workers’ pay. Ex-
pressed as a share of non-Hispanic whites’ 
earnings, wages of Latino workers were 
essentially flat from 1994 to 2009, both in 
Texas and the rest of the U.S. (Chart 4). 
The Latino wage gap vis-à-vis non-
Hispanic whites hasn’t closed, but it hasn’t 
worsened either. This can be regarded as 
good news because several factors could 
have led to a widening during the 1990s, a 
period of massive immigration of less-edu-
cated Latinos, or afterward, a time marked 
by a general rise in U.S. income inequality.  
The enduring gap between the relative 
wages of native-born Texas Latinos and their 
U.S. counterparts remains disconcerting. 
For at least 15 years, native Latinos’ relative 
wages have been 20 percentage points lower 
in Texas than in the rest of the country.
Differences across groups of U.S.-born 
workers are much harder to explain than 
native–immigrant disparities. After all, mea-
sured against non-Hispanic whites, the Lati-
no second generation is no different in terms 
of legal status. All children born in the U.S. 
are automatically citizens. We also see no 
differences in language acquisition because 
second-generation Latinos are overwhelm-
ingly fluent English speakers. What hasn’t 
equalized is education. The big differences 
in years of schooling translate into big dis-
parities in earnings. 
Closing the Gap
Latinos represent the state’s fastest-
growing demographic group and 38 percent 
more impressive. Newcomers typically af-
fect wages in two ways—by increasing labor 
market competition and by diluting the av-
erage wage.
Hispanic wage growth stalled as a 
result of the 2001 recession. Over the next 
four years, real wages fell in Texas, while 
they were flat in the rest of the country. 
Texas had participated in the high-tech 
boom, and the 2001 bust hit the state hard. 
As a result, the recession was more severe 
in Texas and recovery was slower.13 While 
few Latinos may have worked in the high-
tech sector itself, they benefited when the 
overall Texas economy was up and suffered 
when it was down.
Recent movements have been more 
favorable. Texas Latinos’ wages recovered in 
2007–09, moving back toward the U.S. trend.
Unemployment rates confirm that labor 
market conditions have improved for Latinos 
over the past 15 years. The fraction of the 
Texas Latino labor force actively seeking work 
but not employed was more than 8 percent in 
1994, but it had fallen to 5 percent by 2007–09, 
converging to the rate for non-Hispanic white 
workers, according to CPS data. 
Both Latino natives and immigrants  
experienced rising wages in 1994–2009 
(Chart 3). The disparity between Texas and 
U.S. Latino wages is much larger for na-
tives than for immigrants. In fact, wages for 
foreign-born Latinos in Texas and the U.S. 
almost converged in 2009, while wages for 
natives diverged further.
Latino wage performance can also be 
Chart 3
Wages Rising for Latino Natives and Immigrants
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2 Texas employment data come from the Texas Workforce 
Commission and Bureau of Labor and Statistics, with 
seasonal adjustments by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
3 Data are available at www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames.
4 We use the merged outgoing rotation group files of the 
Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey.
5 We use the terms foreign born and immigrant inter-
changeably. We define immigrants as people born abroad 
who are not U.S. citizens at birth (that is, not born abroad to 
parents who are U.S. citizens).
6 The earnings data are based on median hourly or weekly 
earnings to avoid the influence of outliers on average wages; 
at the median, half of all observed wages lie above and half 
below.
7 See “Pulling Apart: A State-by-State Analysis of Income 
Trends,” by Jared Bernstein, Elizabeth McNichol and Karen 
Lyons, Economic Policy Institute and Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, January 2006.
8 See “Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 2008,” Pew 
Hispanic Center Fact Sheet, April 15, 2009.
9 See “Differences Between Mexican Migration to the U.S. 
Border and the Interior,” by Pia M. Orrenius, Madeline 
Zavodny and Leslie Lukens, in Labor Market Issues Along the 
U.S.–Mexico Border, Marie T. Mora and Alberto Dávila, ed., 
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009.
10 We use the national Consumer Price Index (CPI) to deflate 
wages because there is no state-level CPI. A state-level CPI 
would capture the differential growth in living costs and 
would be preferable.
11 Values are from the Census Bureau’s 2008 American 
Community Survey and are the most recent available at the 
state level. Other data suggest home prices have dropped 
since 2008.
12 Affordability shares are from the Wells Fargo Housing 
Opportunity Index, which assumes a family can afford to 
spend 28 percent of its gross income on housing costs.
13 See “Texas in the Most Recent Recession and Recovery,” 
by Mine Yücel, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas The Face of 
Texas: Jobs, People, Business, Change, October 2005.
14 See “Population Change in Texas: Implications for Human, 
Socioeconomic and Natural Resources in the 21st Century,” 
speech by Steve H. Murdock, University of Texas at San 
Antonio, April 29, 2004, http://recenter.tamu.edu/speeches/
land04Murdock.pdf.
15 See “Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 
2007,” Pew Hispanic Center, March 2009.
16 See “Latinos and Education: Explaining the Attainment 
Gap,” by Mark Hugo Lopez, Pew Hispanic Center, October 
2009.
17 See “The Changing Pathways of Hispanic Youths into 
Adulthood,” by Richard Fry, Pew Hispanic Center, October 
2009.  
as major reasons Latinos don’t perform as 
well in school as other demographic groups. 
Respondents also cited no need for further 
schooling to pursue their chosen line of work.
In Texas, more and better educa-
tion—specifically, in the areas of degree 
completion and English fluency—are keys 
to achieving higher wages among Latino 
workers. A more diversified immigrant 
stream would also contribute to this aim. 
Complementarities among high- and low-
skilled migrants suggest this would improve 
living standards for both groups. 
Comprehensive immigration reform in 
conjunction with higher education would 
help Latinos access more high-paying occu-
pations. Minimum-wage policies may help 
raise incomes for low-wage workers who 
stay on the job but can hurt employment 
prospects for teenagers and other young 
and inexperienced workers.
Orrenius is a research officer and senior econo-
mist and Kerr is a research analyst at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas. Zavodny is a professor of 
economics at Agnes Scott College in Decatur, Ga.
Notes
1 Most U.S. surveys ask individuals if they are Hispanic, not 
Latino. We therefore treat the two as equivalent. However, 
we note that individuals of Spanish ancestry might identify 
themselves as Hispanic but usually would not be considered 
Latinos, while individuals of Brazilian ancestry might not 
identify themselves as Hispanic but usually would be 
considered Latino. All Hispanic population data cited in this 
article are from the Census Bureau.
of its labor force. By 2030, they’re expected to 
make up a majority of the state’s population, 
a prospect that increases the importance of 
understanding the social and economic fac-
tors behind the Latino wage gap.14
Education deficits are clearly a key 
reason Texas’ Latinos haven’t narrowed the 
wage gap with non-Hispanic whites. Even so, 
it’s puzzling why native-born Latinos have a 
much lower average educational attainment 
in Texas than in other states. 
National research on Latino educational 
outcomes offers a few clues about what may 
be inhibiting education. Most important, 
schooling may be interrupted by the need to 
work or take care of family responsibilities. 
Latinos tend to have higher poverty rates, 
lower incomes and larger families than non-
Hispanic whites.15 
Latinos are also more likely to lack 
health insurance, and sickness or acci-
dents in a family could push students out 
of school and into work. In a recent Pew 
Hispanic Center poll, 74 percent of young 
Latino respondents who had not gone on to 
college said they left school to help support 
their families.16
Young Latinos are also more likely 
than non-Hispanic whites of similar age to 
be neither in school nor at work; Latinas in 
particular are more likely to leave school to 
raise children.17
Native-born Latinos are often the chil-
dren of immigrants. Latino respondents in the 
Pew survey cited a lack of parental involve-
ment and a poorer knowledge of English 
Chart 4
Latino Wage Gap Persists but Doesn’t Widen
Latinos’ median weekly earnings, as a share of non-Hispanic whites’ earnings
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A Conversation with Jason Saving
Texas in Better Fiscal Shape than Most Other States
Q. What can you tell us about Texas’ state 
finances? 
A.  Texas  hasn’t  had  the  same  tax  revenue 
losses  as  many  other  states.  Our  economy 
has generally fared better than the nation’s 
during  this  recession.  The  state  unemploy-
ment  rate  has  been  a  percentage  point  or 
more below the national rate. Job losses have 
been smaller. Personal income has fallen at 
a slower rate, and the same is likely true for 
total output.
Faring better hasn’t meant escaping re-
cession, and the state did confront some fiscal 
turbulence in 2009. Several one-time revenue 
gains, including $6 billion in federal stimu-
lus funding, offset declining tax receipts and 
enabled Texas to maintain services without 
drawing down the state’s rainy-day fund. 
State sales tax revenue has softened con-
siderably during the recession—for example, 
the second quarter saw a 6.5 percent decline 
from the same period last year. At the same 
time, outlays in key programs, including Medi-
caid,  continue  to  increase.  This  suggests  a 
more challenging fiscal environment in 2010 as 
policymakers attempt to reconcile greater de-
mand for state services with shrinking revenue. 
Q. Has the recession been as hard on states as 
it’s been on the federal government?
A. The federal deficit has more than tripled, 
going from $454 billion in 2008 to $1.4 trillion 
in 2009. This expansion has had two main 
causes—a  dramatic  increase  in  spending 
aimed at getting the economy moving again 
and a dramatic reduction in tax revenues as 
firms and individuals face lower profits and 
incomes.
Almost every state has had to confront—
or  is  still  confronting—budgetary  shortfalls 
since the start of the recession. Taken togeth-
er, the shortfalls are in the neighborhood of 
$100 billion in fiscal 2009, and they’re expect-
ed to total about $170 billion in fiscal 2010. 
At first glance, it might seem the reces-
sion has been far easier on states than the 
federal government. But this would be incor-
rect. It’s important to remember that states, 
with the exception of Vermont, are required 
to balance their budgets year-in and year-out. 
The federal government can spend more 
as revenues decline, but states have to make 
difficult decisions that often impose real and 
immediate pain on ordinary citizens. When 
revenues can’t cover expenditures, states are 
required to raise taxes or scale back spend-
ing—typically at a time when cash-strapped 
citizens need all the help they can get. 
Q. Why has Texas had fewer fiscal problems 
than most other states? 
A. Several factors are at work. One is a busi-
ness-friendly environment, which has helped 
keep alive firms that might have succumbed 
to the recession elsewhere. Another is a rise 
in state government spending that was slower 
than the national average after the 2001–02 
recession, creating less of a spending over-
hang to pare back in hard times. Yet another 
is that the Texas economy entered recession 
later than other states, partly due to such fac-
tors as high energy prices and the friendly 
business climate.
But a key factor often missed in these 
kinds of discussions is Texas’ reliance on sales 
taxes rather than income taxes. Income takes 
a much bigger hit than consumption during 
economic downturns because people try to 
maintain their living standards while endur-
ing temporary wage cuts or unemployment 
spells. So income tax revenue tends to fall 
further than sales tax revenue during reces-
sions, leaving income-tax-reliant states facing 
deeper fiscal shortfalls.
We’ve seen this during the recession. In 
the second quarter, overall revenue from state 
income taxes fell 15 percent from the same 
period last year, whereas sales tax revenue 
across the 50 states was down only 6 percent. 
The flip side is that income-tax-reliant states 
have greater room to increase spending dur-
ing recoveries. That’s not receiving a lot of 
play at the moment—for obvious reasons.
Q. Does Texas face any significant budget 
issues?
A.  Texas  certainly  faces  fiscal  challenges. 
A  short-term  issue  is  the  newly  reformed 
franchise  tax,  which  is  generating  about   
$1 billion less in annual revenue than fore-
cast. Only part of that gap can be attributed 
to the recession. Recent changes to the tax 
have  actually  further  reduced  revenue—for 
example, by raising the income threshold at 
which taxes must be paid. The franchise tax 
provides less than 10 percent of state reve-
nue, but this is still an issue the state will have 
to deal with in the near future.
An intermediate-term issue is Medicaid, 
which has almost doubled in size over the last 
decade in Texas and now consumes a quar-
ter of the state’s overall budget. Getting those 
outlays under control would free up money 
for other priorities, but virtually every state 
has struggled to reach this goal in an era of 
rapid increases in health care costs. The fed-
eral government’s health care reform has the 
potential to slow the rise in costs, but most 
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proposals now on the table would also dra-
matically expand Medicaid rolls. If not prop-
erly handled, reform could actually worsen 
Texas’ fiscal strains.
Over the longer term, the most impor-
tant fiscal issue will be improving education 
and  infrastructure  without  sacrificing  the 
low taxes and business-friendly climate that 
have helped the state’s economy grow faster 
than the nation’s. If the state fails to improve 
graduation rates among Hispanics or fails to 
modernize its highway network, for example, 
economic growth and tax revenue could suf-
fer over time. On the other hand, failing to 
maintain a low-tax policy environment may 
also slow growth and exacerbate state fiscal 
imbalances. 
Q. Besides Texas, are other states doing 
reasonably well on the fiscal side?
A. A number of Great Plains-area states man-
aged to get through fiscal 2009 without sig-
nificant fiscal shortfalls, including Arkansas, 
Iowa,  Kansas,  Montana,  Nebraska  and  the 
Dakotas. Most are states with the fewest job 
losses in this recession, including one—North 
Dakota—that has actually gained jobs over 
the past nine months.
But the best available estimates suggest 
that even these states face significant fiscal 
pressures in 2010 and 2011, partly because 
of the sheer depth of the recession and partly 
because of fluctuations in the food and en-
ergy prices that help drive their economies. 
Q. Which states are facing the biggest budget 
messes?
A. The state facing the greatest fiscal chal-
lenge—bar none—is California, where legis-
lators wrestled with a shortfall of almost $40 
billion in fiscal 2009 and face even greater 
fiscal pressures in 2010. Spending in the pre-
vious five years rose 3 to 4 percentage points 
faster than inflation and population growth. 
Then  the  recession  hit.  Revenue  from  the 
state’s steeply progressive income tax has fall-
en by a whopping 20 percent over the past 
year, so the spending levels simply couldn’t 
be maintained with available revenue.
Other states that face an especially chal-
lenging  2010  include 
Arizona,  Nevada  and 
New York. Each of these 
states  increased  spend-
ing at a relatively rapid 
rate  during  expansion, 
and  each  is  now  strug-
gling to close very sub-
stantial shortfalls.
Q. When states cut 
spending, what usually 
gets the ax?
A. State spending is divided into three broad 
categories of roughly equal size: social ser-
vices, education and criminal justice. All are 
valuable and all tend to be trimmed when 
states  face  recession-induced  budget  short-
falls. Eligibility requirements are tightened for 
welfare  programs  and  checks  are  reduced; 
funding for schools is curtailed and elemen-
tary and high school class sizes are increased; 
judicial backlogs grow and enforcement ef-
forts can suffer.
Unfortunately, these cutbacks often oc-
cur at precisely the time the programs are 
needed most, when poor job market pros-
pects induce individuals to seek social assis-
tance, return to school or perhaps even com-
mit crimes. 
Q. How can states prepare themselves for the 
fiscal shock of recession?
A. They can do a couple of things to be better 
prepared for adverse economic circumstanc-
es. One is to lessen reliance on taxes that 
are strongly tied to current economic condi-
tions, so that tax revenues will be less likely 
to plunge precisely when demands for state 
services are greatest.
Another  is  to  resist  the  temptation  to 
dramatically  ramp  up  spending  during  re-
coveries, so that fewer cuts will be needed 
during recessions. Balancing the budget over 
time requires saving during booms—whether 
we’re talking about states or individuals. The 
strategy can be hard to do at times but pays 
dividends when the economy worsens.
The most important thing a state can do 
to prepare for the fiscal shock of recession is 
offer a business-friendly environment. Doing 
so helps states enter recession with a relative-
ly strong tax base and helps sow the seeds of 
a relatively quick recovery because startups 
can make profits earlier in the business cycle.
Texas  has  done  relatively  well  along 
most of these dimensions, generally relying 
on taxes that don’t swing wildly with current 
economic conditions and providing a condu-
cive tax and regulatory environment for busi-
ness. It’s important to bear in mind, though, 
that no state can fully insulate itself from re-
cession or its fiscal consequences.
Q. Will economic recovery be enough to resolve 
most states’ budget troubles? 
A. It typically takes two to three years for 
state  fiscal  pressures  to  abate,  in  part  be-
cause firms don’t hire as quickly as consum-
ers  would  like  and  consumers  don’t  open 
their pocketbooks as quickly as firms would 
like. Going by historical record, it wouldn’t 
be at all surprising to see further tax hikes 
or spending cuts at the state level in 2010 
or even 2011 as policymakers struggle to get 
back on an even keel.
Some  analysts  believe  the  depth  and 
breadth of the current recession could ex-
tend these postrecession blues by an addi-
tional year or two beyond the norm. It’s too 
early to say whether this scenario will play 
out, but it’s fair to say the onset of economic 
recovery won’t immediately take care of state 
fiscal woes.
“A key factor is Texas’ reliance on sales taxes rather 
than income taxes. Income takes a much bigger hit 
than consumption during economic downturns.” SpotLight
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Farm Real Estate Values
Texas Holds Steady in 2008, Bucking U.S. Trend
The value of Texas agricultural land has 
followed  national  trends  since  the  early 
1990s. Last year, however, the state’s aver-
age price per acre remained unchanged, a 
sharp contrast to the nation’s first decline in 
17 years. Texas was one of only eight states 
that didn’t see falling farm values in 2008.
The  most  recent  Department  of  Agri-
culture report shows U.S. farm real estate, 
adjusted for inflation, was worth an average 
of $2,100 an acre in 2008, down 3.2 percent 
from the previous year (Chart 1). Farm real 
estate values include land and buildings.
The average value of Texas agricultural 
land remained at $1,550 an acre in 2008. Texas 
trails the nation because much of its farmland 
is arid with poor soil, so it can’t match other 
states’ crop yields. Some states, like California, 
have good growing conditions for high-value 
permanent crops like fruits and nuts.
Nearly 80 percent of Texas’ land is de-
voted to agriculture. Pastureland accounts for 
two-thirds of the total, supporting a livestock 
industry that ranked No. 1 in the nation with 
more than $10.5 billion in sales in 2007. Crop-
land takes up most of the rest of Texas’ rural 
acreage, with corn, cotton and hay—the top 
three  crops—combining  for  production  of 
more than $3.3 billion in 2008. Texas trails only 
California in total agricultural production.
Several factors most likely contributed 
to the resiliency of Texas farm values in 2008. 
First, the Texas economy performed better 
than the national average, and it wasn’t hurt 
as badly by a residential real estate crisis that 
elsewhere slowed the conversion of farm-
land into nonagricultural development. 
Second, prices for Texas’ most impor-
tant  agricultural  products  have  held  up 
better than the prices for the leading farm 
products  in  other  states.  Livestock  prices 
remained  steady  in  2008  and  grain  prices 
increased,  supporting  land  values  by  pro-
viding healthy incomes for Texas ranchers 
and  farmers  (Chart  2).  Meanwhile,  prices 
dropped for dairy products and vegetables, 
harming the farm sectors in states heavily in-
vested in those commodities.
Hunters a Plus
A third factor bolstering farm real estate 
values arises from Texans’ passion for hunting, 
a source of lucrative lease income for many 
landowners. From 1996 to 2006, the number of 
hunters fell 10 percent nationally but rose 21 
percent in Texas, according to a U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service survey. Over the decade, spend-
ing by Texas hunters increased 22 percent. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City re-
search found that for each 4 percent increase 
in hunting lease rates, Texas land values rise 
1 percent. In comparison, livestock receipt 
increases of the same magnitude lead to a 
0.56  percent  increase  in  land  values.  For 
crop receipts, the gain is only 0.11 percent.
Looking ahead, it’s likely that farmland 
values will be flat to slightly down this year. 
Several factors are putting downward pres-
sure  on  land  values—a  sharp  weakening 
of the Texas economy, tighter credit condi-
tions, weaker commodity prices and severe 
drought conditions in much of the state.
The Dallas Fed’s third quarter agricul-
tural survey found that farmland sales con-
tinued to weaken. More than a third of ag-
ricultural lenders responding to the survey 
expected a continued decline in farm real 
estate  loans  in  the  near  term. “The  trend 
in  farmland  prices  remains  negative,  with 
nearly all respondents expecting either no 
change or a decline in farmland values over 
the next three months,” the survey reported.
— Emily Kerr and Keith R. Phillips
Chart 1
Texas Farmland Values Flat in 2008
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Chart 2
Rising Agricultural Prices Support Texas Land Values
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Florida and Colorado—states that had a high 
incidence of risky, high-cost loans. Accord-
ing to the Mortgage Bankers Association, the 
three states’ share of subprime adjustable-rate 
mortgage (ARM) loans was above 8 percent 
the foreclosure rate was a mild 0.13 percent 
(Chart 1A). 
At that time, only a few states showed 
clusters of counties with somewhat high 
foreclosure rates. These included California, 
Texas Holds Steady in 2008, Bucking U.S. Trend Texas Dodges Worst of Foreclosure Woes
By D’Ann Petersen and Laila Assanie
Texas bucked the national housing down-
turn—for a while. A strong economy and 
low costs of living and doing business 
attracted firms and new residents. The in-
migration helped buoy the housing sector, 
and home construction, prices and sales 
held up in Texas even as they began to de-
cline nationally.1
In time, Texas’ housing market followed 
the nation’s downward path. Home con-
struction began plummeting in the second 
half of 2006—several months behind the 
nation. Texas existing-home sales started fall-
ing in mid-2007. The picture worsened con-
siderably in 2008 as labor markets weakened 
and a troubled financial environment made 
mortgages more difficult to obtain.
The housing bust leaves in its wake 
elevated foreclosure levels in Texas and 
the U.S. Like other consequences of the 
bust, foreclosures have been less severe in 
Texas. While the nation’s foreclosure rate has 
grown nearly sixfold over the last four years, 
Texas’ has climbed only marginally.
Housing markets in Texas and the U.S. 
have shown signs of stabilizing in recent 
months. Home sales and construction starts 
are beginning to tick up, thanks in large 
part to low mortgage rates and the first-time 
homebuyer tax credit. Despite the improve-
ment, segments remain weak, especially the 
higher-priced move-up market.
Foreclosures are likely to persist in 
2010—a concern because they can add to 
inventories and put downward pressure on 
home values. However, expectations are for 
Texas’ foreclosures to remain low compared 
with the nation as a whole.
Geography of Foreclosures
The foreclosure crisis has hit some parts 
of the country much harder than others. 
Most of the distressed housing activity is cur-
rently concentrated in just a few states. Texas 
isn’t one of them. Its foreclosure rate ranks 
28th in the nation and last among big states.
RealtyTrac data show foreclosure activ-
ity by county. We mapped foreclosures rela-
tive to the number of households in each 
county as of fourth quarter 2005, when the 
national housing crisis had yet to unfold and 
Chart 1
Foreclosure Rates by County—Before Housing Crisis and Now
















NOTE: The foreclosure rate is the number of foreclosure filings divided by the number of households in each county times 100.
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or no equity at origination, so the rampant 
depreciation left many of them owing more 
than their home’s value and unable to sell 
or refinance without taking a loss. These 
so-called underwater mortgages began to 
increase, putting even more downward pres-
sure on home prices. Because of its more 
stable home values, Texas has had a relative-
ly low share of homeowners with negative 
equity, ranking 35th among states.3
Moreover, Texans didn’t rely on risky 
loans as heavily as borrowers in other states 
during the boom years. Fewer interest-only 
and negatively amortized loans were taken 
out in the state, according to a Dallas Fed 
study.4 And only 43.1 percent of Texas sub-
prime borrowers used cash-out refinancing, 
compared with 57.3 percent for the nation.5 
More equity has made Texas home  owners 
less vulnerable to default in cases of eco-
nomic or personal adversity.
Texas Hot Spots
Many factors influence foreclosure rates. 
Recent research shows that differences in 
U.S. counties’ foreclosure rates are associated 
with unemployment, housing affordability, 
changes in home prices and the share of 
minority homeowners with high-cost loans. 
This also holds true in Texas.6
Of the 254 counties in Texas, only four 
had foreclosure rates exceeding the national 
average in third quarter 2009. Twenty-six 
reported rates higher than the state average 
(Table 1). Economic and demographic char-
acteristics common to these hot spots help 
explain why their foreclosure rates are some-
what higher:
Unemployment. A weak economy can 
make it difficult for households to keep up 
with mortgage payments. One-earner and 
low-income households are particularly vul-
nerable to economic or financial shocks. 
While Texas’ unemployment rate has 
remained well below the nation’s, most hot-
spot counties saw joblessness increase by 
more than the state average between De-
cember 2006 and September 2009. Johnson 
County, which has the third-highest foreclo-
sure rate in Texas, saw the largest increase 
in unemployment, probably because of the 
sharp fall in Barnett Shale natural gas drilling 
activity in the area.
Galveston saw its unemployment rate 
rise significantly as devastation from Hur-
ricane Ike in September 2008 forced busi-
nesses to close. Along the Mexican border, 
Cameron and Hidalgo counties also saw 
above-average increases in unemployment. 
high unemployment. While foreclosure-rate 
increases are widespread, Nevada, Arizona, 
California and Florida account for most of 
the foreclosure activity. More than 40 percent 
of the counties with rates above the U.S. av-
erage are in these four states. 
Texas is now faring better in the fore-
closure crisis in part because of a healthier 
economy. The state outperformed the na-
tion in job growth in 2006 and 2007. Even 
as the U.S. economy was mired in recession 
in 2008, Texas saw modest job growth. This 
year, the pace of job losses steepened in 
Texas, closely matching the U.S. rate.  
Another key for the state is a housing 
market that didn’t see the price escalation 
other big states did during the boom years. 
As a result, Texas didn’t experience a price-
bubble bust. In fact, home values have held 
up relatively well. 
The purchase-only home price index, 
issued by the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), shows that home values 
appreciated 4.6 percent in Texas from the 
end of 2006 to second quarter 2009 while 
they fell 10.3 percent nationwide (Chart 2).2 
Among the hardest hit states were Nevada, 
Arizona, California and Florida—those with 
the highest third-quarter foreclosure activity. 
Several metropolitan areas in these states saw 
prices plummet more than 40 percent.
A large share of borrowers had little 
in fourth quarter 2005, compared with 6.7 
percent for the nation. 
In Texas, foreclosure rates were elevat-
ed in several parts of the state in 2005, even 
though the economy was expanding and 
the housing market was still on an upswing. 
As a result, Texas’ foreclosure rate of 0.26 
percent was double the national average. 
Several areas of the state, especially coun-
ties within the Dallas–Fort Worth and Austin 
metropolitan areas, were still feeling the 
aftereffects of a high-tech bust that persisted 
for several years after 2001 and left a signifi-
cant share of white-collar workers without 
jobs. In fact, some counties in the two metro 
areas were among the top 25 in the U.S. for 
foreclosure rates in fourth quarter 2005. 
Fast-forwarding to third quarter 2009, 
Texas looks pretty much the same (Chart 1B). 
Overall, the state’s foreclosure rate edged up 
to 0.32 percent, and a few more counties 
saw foreclosures rise.
But the picture looks strikingly different 
elsewhere. Falling home prices, rising unem-
ployment and resets on risky loans spread 
and intensified the foreclosure crisis. By the 
third quarter of this year, the nation’s foreclo-
sure rate had hit 0.73 percent, up from 0.13 
percent in fourth quarter 2005.
Many areas are showing signs of dis-
tress, including the manufacturing belt, as 
the downturn in the auto industry feeds 
Chart 2
Home Values Holding Up Better in Texas than Nation
(House price index, fourth quarter 2006 to second quarter 2009)
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spending on mortgages. Nonetheless, ratios 
for most Texas counties are below the na-
tional average and much lower than the 
more expensive areas of the country, such as 
California’s Santa Clara County at 3.5 and San 
Francisco County at 3.3.
Home prices. County-level home-price 
data are difficult to come by, so we assigned 
each county the FHFA’s house-price index 
value for its metro area.8 Using this proxy, 
three of the four counties with the highest 
foreclosure rates are in the DFW area, where 
home-price appreciation was the slowest 
among major Texas metros. Indeed, county-
level Realtor data for DFW show prices 
fell over the past year in these three coun-
ties—Kaufman, Johnson and Rockwall—and 
The border region often sees higher unem-
ployment during economic downturns  
because average households are younger and 
less educated than in other parts of the state.
Housing affordability. Loan-to-
income ratios are a good proxy for determin-
ing owners’ ability to repay mortgages. The 
higher the ratio, the more likely the borrower 
is to default in cases of sudden change in 
financial or economic circumstances. The 
average loan-to-income ratio for Texas coun-
ties is 1.6, compared with 2.2 for U.S coun-
ties—an indication that affordability is high in 
the state.7 
All hot-spot counties have loan-to-
income ratios above the state average, how-
ever, suggesting relatively high household 
existing-home inventories are higher than 
the state average.
Deteriorating prices are a significant 
reason for high foreclosures in other parts of 
the country but are a less-important factor 
in Texas. Average Texas home prices have 
been relatively stable, despite declines in  
some pockets. The state’s modest apprecia-
tion, however, hasn’t led to significant equity 
gains for homeowners, either.
New construction activity. The 26 
hot-spot counties have posted significant 
new construction since 2000. The number of 
housing units grew an average of 22.7 per-
cent from 2000 to 2008, compared with 17.1 
percent for Texas and 11 percent for the U.S. 
The biggest increases were in the sub-
urbs—for example, Rockwall County saw 
a 66 percent gain. Its foreclosure rate is the 
state’s fourth highest. Six other hot-spot 
counties recorded construction increases of 
40 percent or more. 
Because of a strong pullback in con-
struction in the past two years, new-home 
inventories have recently come down in 
Texas, which should mitigate the impact of 
higher foreclosures.
Ethnicity and loan cost. Ethnicity 
plays a role in the likelihood of foreclosure 
partly because minority homeowners on 
average are younger, have lower incomes 
and have fewer years of schooling than non-
Hispanic white homeowners. These factors 
make job losses more likely in economic 
downturns. The same factors make qualify-
ing for a mortgage more difficult, often rais-
ing the cost of home loans for minorities. 
In the U.S. and Texas, minorities have 
been hit hardest by the current recession. 
National unemployment rates stand at 15.6 
percent for blacks and 12.7 percent for His-
panics, compared with 9.3 percent for non-
Hispanic whites. In the U.S., 31 percent of 
both black and Hispanic households have 
higher-cost loans, compared with 26 percent 
of non-Hispanic white households.9 
Texas has a large Hispanic population. 
For this demographic group, pricey loans are 
common in most Texas counties, not just in 
the hot spots. Statewide, the share of higher-
cost loans among Hispanics is 48.3 percent. 
The share of costly loans among black Texans 
is more than 60 percent in many hot-spot 
counties, compared with the state average 
of 36.5 percent and national average of 31.8 
percent. 
Overall, the analysis shows that Texas 
counties with high foreclosure rates generally 
have sharp jumps in unemployment, high 
Table 1
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home-pur-
chase loans)
Kaufman .90 4.3 2.0 5.7 21.1 70.2 45.1
Bastrop .84 4.2 2.0 11.0 12.5 82.1 46.5
Johnson .82 5.2 1.9 5.9 16.0 57.1 47.4
Rockwall .76 4.0 2.3 5.7 66.0 63.6 31.4
Comal .57 3.1 2.2 9.0 40.2 35.3 28.7
Williamson .56 4.5 2.2 11.0 48.3 33.9 31.9
Parker .53 4.5 2.0 5.9 13.4 75.0 34.7
Fort Bend .52 4.5 2.0 9.4 33.9 60.2 41.5
Collin .50 4.2 2.2 5.7 45.0 47.3 39.6
Kendall .48 2.7 2.2 9.0 40.1 0.0 14.0
Ellis .46 4.6 2.1 5.7 30.9 38.3 42.3
Montgomery .45 4.3 2.0 9.4 43.3 60.9 39.8
Tarrant .44 4.1 2.1 5.9 20.5 61.3 43.5
Dallas .43 4.3 2.1 5.7 10.4 67.7 55.6
Hays .43 3.4 2.2 11.0 42.0 40.4 33.8
Cameron .43 5.0 2.0 7.0 20.8 42.9 55.3
Denton .42 4.1 2.1 5.7 32.6 50.1 41.2
Bell .41 2.8 2.0 8.5 24.6 59.6 42.8
Hidalgo .40 4.7 2.0  .2 30.4 39.3 57.6
Harris .39 4.4 2.1 9.4 21.4 69.6 51.7
Burnet .38 3.0 2.0 10.7 26.1 50.0 57.9
Galveston .38 4.2 1.9 9.4 18.8 64.3 46.5
Guadalupe .37 3.1 2.1 9.0 26.6 36.9 30.0
Bexar .37 3.3 2.1 9.0 16.9 39.9 41.6
Travis .35 3.7 2.3 11.0 26.9 43.2 33.2
Brazoria .33 4.7 2.1 9.4 27.3 55.4 39.5
Texas avg. .32 3.6 1.6 7.8 17.1 36.5 48.3
U.S. avg. .73 5.4 2.2 –5.6 11.0 31.8 30.7
NOTES: The loan-to-income ratios and the higher-priced-loans data are simple averages for Texas and the U.S. Home price appreciation 
reflects combined metro/nonmetro series.
SOURCES: RealtyTrac; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Pew Hispanic Research Center; Federal Housing Finance Agency; Census Bureau.SouthwestEconomy    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • FOURTH QUARTER 2009 14
loan-to-income ratios, slower home-price ap-
preciation, significant new construction and 
a greater prevalence of high-priced lending 
to minorities. By and large, most counties 
with these characteristics are found within 
the state’s four most heavily populated metro 
areas (Chart 3).
A Look Ahead
Most homeowners are current on their 
mortgage payments, but a rising share have 
seen their finances shaken as home values 
have fallen, mortgage interest rates have 
reset upward and job losses have reduced 
family income. Foreclosures will likely be a 
headwind for the housing sector and over-
all U.S. economy well into 2010. 
Indeed, several factors suggest the 
national foreclosure situation may worsen 
before it gets better. 
First, the U.S. economy remains weak 
and the unemployment rate is high.
Second, mortgage delinquencies are 
increasing. While the worst of the subprime 
troubles are behind us, a wave of alt-A and 
option ARM resets in 2010 will hit hard in 
states with high shares of those riskier mort-
gages.10 Delinquency rates on even “safe” 
prime loans—the lion’s share of outstanding 
mortgages—are climbing (Chart 4). 
Third, moratoriums put in place in 
late 2008 and early 2009 have slowed the 
foreclosure process and pushed activity into 
late 2009 and early 2010. 
Counteracting these factors are falling 
prices and the first-time homebuyer tax 
credit, which are boosting sales in most 
areas of the country. In addition, govern-
ment agencies have launched efforts such 
as the Home Affordable Modification Pro-
gram that may resolve some of the pending 
foreclosures. Unfortunately, the share of 
Chart 4
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COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE: Recession Takes Toll, Banks Put at Risk
POPULATION TRENDS: Texas’ Strong Economy Still a Draw for Immigrants 
Texas’ commercial real estate market steadily worsened as 
recession took hold in 2009. 
Third-quarter office vacancy rates hit 22.7 percent in Dallas 
and 15.3 percent in Houston—both high by recent standards. 
Most major metros saw absorption—the rate at which markets 
soak up inventory—turn negative in the retail, warehouse and 
office sectors. The metros’ August investment activity, measured 
by the dollar volume of completed sales, was down 80 percent 
year over year, roughly in line with the U.S. decline. 
Commercial real estate’s woes don’t bode well for banks 
already struggling with losses from residential loans. The num-
ber of distressed properties—those in foreclosure, in bankrupt-
cy or restructured—is rising. 
The  Eleventh  Federal  Reserve  District,  which  includes 
Texas, has heavy exposure to commercial real estate loans. As 
of the second quarter, these loans accounted for 28 percent of 
district banks’ gross assets, compared with 14 percent for banks 
nationally. Thus far, the district share of nonperforming loans 
has been below the U.S. average.
Financing  for  new  projects  remains  tight.  September 
contract values for retail, warehouse and office projects fell 
71 percent year over year. Anecdotal reports suggest inves-
tors have been on the sidelines, ready to act once the market   
bottoms out. A slowly improving economy offers hope that the 
market will stabilize in 2010. 
—Jackson Thies
Texas’  foreign-born  population  increased  in  2008  by 
58,320, or 1.5 percent, according to newly released data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. 
Many  of  the  state’s  metropolitan  areas  saw  notable 
gains. Austin was up 5.9 percent, El Paso 3.4 percent and 
Dallas–Fort Worth and Houston 2.7 percent each. 
Texas’ increases occurred despite a 0.26 percent decline 
in the nation’s foreign-born population  —a rare occurrence 
that’s attributable to the recession, which began in December 
2007. 
The  economic  slump  weakened  demand  for  foreign 
labor, discouraging would-be migrants from coming to the 
U.S. Indeed, foreign-born population declines were steep in 
states hit hardest by recession—4.4 percent in Michigan and 
1.4 percent in both Florida and Nevada. 
For the U.S., the decline in Mexican immigrants was 
particularly sharp, falling 2.8 percent to 11.4 million. Many 
Mexicans work in construction, a sector in which employ-
ment fell 9.1 percent in 2008. 
Some  U.S.–Mexico  border  states  recorded  significant 
losses in immigrant stocks, with Arizona down nearly 6 per-
cent and California off 1.6 percent.
The recession didn’t hit as hard in Texas as in many 
other states. Texas employment edged up in 2008, and con-
struction employment fell only 1.1 percent.
—Mike Nicholson
QUOTABLE: “Texas entered recession a bit later than the nation, but 
once it did, we went from boom to bust in a terrible hurry.”
–Pia Orrenius, Research Officer and Senior Economist 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME: Texas Posts Gain in Otherwise Tough Year 
Texans’ real median household income rose 1.3 percent 
in 2008, making the state one of only five with increases in 
the first calendar year of the U.S. recession. During better 
times, 33 states posted income gains in 2007 and only Michi-
gan suffered a decline.
Texas was already in recession before this year began, 
so an increase in household income is less likely for 2009.
U.S. Census Bureau data based on the American Com-
munity Survey show that the U.S. recession, which began in 
December 2007, led to household income decreases in five 
states and no significant change in 40 others in 2008. The 
U.S. as a whole saw a 1.2 percent decline.
Texas ranked third in household income gains in 2008. 
Louisiana led the nation at 3.7 percent, followed by Kansas at 
1.7 percent. Income also rose in New Jersey and New York. 
Texas’ median household income was $50,043 in 2008, 
just below the nation’s $52,029. Maryland had the highest in-
come at $70,545, Mississippi the lowest at $37,790. 
A relatively healthy labor market kept Texans working in 
2008, propping up the state’s household earnings. 
Buoyed by high energy prices and growing exports, 
Texas employment continued to expand for more than six 
months after the nation sank into recession. The state ended 
2008 with job growth of 0.6 percent, while U.S. employment 
fell 2.2 percent. 
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deterioration nationally. Case-Shiller is a value-based index that 
reflects movements in higher-priced homes more accurately but, 
unlike the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) index, is not 
available at the state or metro level. 
3 Data are from Equifax and Moody’s Economy.com. See the Wall 
Street Journal blog Developments, Aug. 11, 2009, http://blogs.
wsj.com/developments/2009/08/05/more-homeowners-upside-
down-on-mortgages. 
4 See “Why Texas Feels Less Subprime Stress than U.S.,” 
by Anil Kumar, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest 
Economy, no. 6, 2008, http://dallasfed.org/research/swe/2008/
swe0806b.cfm.
5 Data are from First American CoreLogic, LoanPerformance and 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 2009.  
6 See “Through Boom and Bust: Minorities, Immigrants and 
Homeownership,” by Rakesh Kochhar, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and 
Daniel Dockterman, Pew Research Center report, May 2009.
7 U.S. and Texas loan-to-income figures are simple averages of 
all counties in each. 
8 The metro house price index includes refinanced properties 
as well as purchases, thus its values may overstate appreciation 
(or underestimate depreciation) compared with the FHFA’s state 
purchase-only index. 
9 See note 6. U.S. figures are simple averages of all counties. 
10 Alt-A mortgages are loans for which the risk profile of the 
borrower falls between prime and subprime. The borrowers have 
inadequate documentation and high loan-to-value and debt-to-
income ratios. An option ARM is an adjustable-rate mortgage that 
offers borrowers the flexibility of four monthly payment options 
to help with cash flow. Options include a specified minimum 
payment, an interest-only payment and 15- and 30-year fully 
amortizing payments.
11 See “Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? 
Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization,” by Manuel Adelino, 
Kristopher Gerardi and Paul S. Willen, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, Public Policy Discussion Papers no. 09-4, July 2009.
homeowners who have taken advantage of 
such programs is small, and redefault rates 
on modified mortgages remain high.11
In Texas, foreclosure trends will bear 
watching. Many Texans have lost their jobs 
during the current recession—a development 
showing up in rising delinquencies on prime 
loans.
On the bright side, the foreclosure 
landscape looks better in Texas than in most 
other states. Home values have held up, and 
foreclosure inventories are lower than the 
national average. According to the Mortgage 
Bankers Association, 2 percent of Texas mort-
gages were in the foreclosure process in third 
quarter 2009, compared with the national 
share of 4.5 percent. In addition, fewer risky 
loans were made in Texas. 
While Dallas Fed forecasts call for only 
a slow rebound in employment, Texas busi-
nesses are growing more optimistic and 
signs are pointing to a recovery in economic 
activity.
Petersen is a business economist and Assanie is an 
associate economist in the Research Department of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
The authors thank RealtyTrac for foreclosure data and Michael 
Nicholson for research assistance. 
1 See “Hot Housing Market Catching Cold in Texas,” by D’Ann 
Petersen, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, 
no. 1, 2008, http://dallasfed.org/research/swe/2008/
swe0801c.cfm.
2 Other indexes, such as Case-Shiller, suggest even more 
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